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Mar. 1953] IsTHMIAN S. S. Co. v. NA'l'. MARINE ETC. AssN. 433 
[40 C.2d 433; 254 P.2d 578) 
where the only issue on habeas corpus is the propriety of is-
suance of the temporary restraining order violated by peti-
tioners. At the time that order was issued, it is undis-
puted that M.E.B.A. had not lost the strike and, accordingly, 
the picketing still arose from the dispute between M.E.B.A. 
and Isthmian. 
In conclusion, I believe that the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act 
was designed to protect an employer from the effects of a 
struggle between two or more unions, either for recognition 
as bargaining agent or for a determination of which has the 
exclusive right to perform certain work, in which the em-
ployer is an innocent party. I do not believe that the statute 
was ever meant to protect an employer who is engaged in 
a dispute with his employees and the union of their choice 
over legitimate labor objectives, and who seeks a ban on other-
wise lawful picketing on the ground that he has signed a 
contract with another union willing to fill the jobs of the 
striking workers, thereby himself creating the ''jurisdictional 
dispute" from which he seeks relief. 
In my opinion the petitioners should be released. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Carter, J., and Traynor, .J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18519. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
ISTHMIAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY (a Corporation), et 
al., Respondents, v. NATIONAij MARINE ENGI-
NEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION et al., Appel-
lants; BROTHERHOOD OF MARINE ENGINEERS, 
AFL et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Injunctions-AppeaL-In determining whether the facts war-
rant an order granting a preliminary injunction, the court on 
appeal must review the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs. 
[2] Id.- Preliminary Injunction.- A preliminary injunction, 
granted to preserve the status quo, is based on the facts as 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 112 ; [2] Injunctions, 
§50; [3] Injunctions, §59. 
434 IsTHMIAN S. S. Co. v. NAT. MARINE ETC. AssN. [ 40 C.2d 
they existed when the action was commenced; and its pro-
priety is not affected by the fact that a temporary restrain-
ing order previously issued in the same action may have swung 
the balance in plaintiffs' favor. 
[3] !d.-Preliminary Injunction.-Whether a preliminary injunc-
tion shall be granted rests largely in the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless there 
is a manifest abuse of discretion. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco granting a preliminary injunc-
tion enjoining picketing. Clarence W. Morris, Judge. Af-
firmed. 
Delany, Werchick, I<'ishgold & Minudri, .Jack H. Werchick, 
Lee Pressman, Robert E. Burns, Cummins, Kent, Draper & 
Bradley for Appellants. 
McCutchen, Thomas, Matthew, Griffiths & Greene and Mor-
ris M. Doyle for Respondents. 
Tobriner & Lazarus and Mathew 0. Tobriner for Inter-
veners and Respondents. 
SHENK, ,J.-This is an appeal from an order granting a 
preliminary injunction enjoining picketing of plaintiffs by 
defendant union in an action for a permanent injunction and 
damages. One phase of this case was before this court in 
In re Regan and In re Kelleher, ante, p. 424 [254 P.2d 
572]. In those cases, Regan and Kelleher sought their re-
lease from custody after their arrest for violating a temporary 
restraining order issued by the court in the action, and we 
there held that the Jurisdictional Strike Law (Lab. Code, 
§ 1115 et seq.) furnished a proper basis for the restraining 
order, and that plaintiffs' employees-marine engineers-
were supervisory employees and hence not subject to the 
National Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 141 et seq.). The factual basis for the preliminary injunc-
tion is the same, with some amplification, as the temporary 
restraining order in the Regan and Kelleher cases. Defendants 
assert facts as grounds for reversal, in addition to the ones 
raised in those cases, but nothing more than a conflict is 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Injunctions, §59; Am.Jur., Injunctions § 267 
et seq. 
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created and the question of credibility of witnesses is pre-
sented, and this has been resolved favorably to plaintiffs by 
the trial court in ordering the preliminary injunction. The 
facts recited in the Kelleher and Regan cases are supported 
by the record here. 
Defendants make three additional legal arguments: (1) 
'fhat a preliminary injunction will not be issued in a "doubt-
ful" case; (2) that such an injunction is to preserve the 
;.;tatus quo as it existed at the commencement of the action 
and this one does not do so because the temporary restraining 
order swung the balance in favor of plaintiff employer, 
Isthmian Steamship Company; and (3) that the injunction 
will cause defendants great damage. 
[1] The first contention is answered in part by the fact 
that the case is not necessarily close on its facts when we 
review the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs, as we 
must do since the trial court made the order in plaintiffs' 
favor. 
[2] The second contention is subject to the same com-
ment as the first and also the injunction was based on the 
facts as they existed when the action was commenced. 
The third, and also the first and second contentions are 
more properly addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 
[3] Whether a preliminary injunction shall be granted rests 
largely in the discretion of the trial court and will not be 
reversed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of dis-
cretion. (Thompson v. lYioore Drydock Co., 27 Cal.2d 595 [165 
P.2d 901]; 14 CaLJur. 180 et seq.) We find no abuse of 
discretion here. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent for the same reasons and upon the 
same grounds stated in my dissents in Voeltz v. Bakery Work-
ers, ante, p. 382 [254 P.2d 553] and In re Kelleher and 
In re Regan, ante, p. 424 [254 P.2d 572]. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Carter, .J., and Traynor, ,J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
